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MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES-TOO MUCH FOR TOO LITTLE?
INTRODUCTION
During the first week in January, 1980, investors purchased a record $2.3
billion dollars worth of money market mutual fund shares. I Offering dividend
yields in excess of 11%,2 the seventy-eight money market funds have grown to
nearly $50 billion in total net assets. 3 Although the growth in money market
funds may not be indicative of similar growth in the other forms of mutual
funds, this rapid influx of investments has called into question the fees paid
by mutual funds to their sponsors in return for advisory services. Conse-
quently, two shareholders of the largest money market fund have sued that
fund and its sponsor,4 alleging that the fund has become so large that the
resulting advisory fee constitutes a breach of the fiduciary dutys imposed on
the fund's adviser by section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(ICA).6 Although this fiduciary duty has been tested on the issues of recapture
of brokerage commissions by a fund 7 and modification of a fund's advisory
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1980, § D, at 9, col. S.
2. Id., § D, at 6, col. 4.
3. Id., § D, at 9, col. 5.
4. Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, No. 79-5726 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 23, 1979);
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., No. 79-3123 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 14,
1979). Reference is made throughout this Note to several mutual funds sponsored by Merrill
Lynch, Inc. or its subsidiaries and affiliates including Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, which Is
a party to both of the cases cited supra. All references to any of these entities are intended to be
purely illustrative of conditions or practices in the mutual fund industry. Neither the author nor
the Fordham Law Review expresses any opinion, express or implied, as to the conduct of any of
the Merrill Lynch companies or of any other mutual fund or adviser.
5. Complaint, 12 at 4-5, Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, No. 79.726
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 23, 1979) (violation of Investment Company Act § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-35(b) (1976)); Complaint, 17 at 4, Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,
No. 79-3123 (S.D.N.Y., June 14, 1979) (excessive advisory fee).
6. Section 36(b) provides in part: "For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser
of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered
investment company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any
affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by
the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such
company, against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or
any fofficer, director, member of any advisory board, depositor, or principal underwriter of an
investment company] who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for
breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered
investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person."
Investment Company Act § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
7. E.g., Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977);
Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Moses v.
Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Brokerage commissions
generated by investment companies are a large source of revenue to brokers who are members of
national securities exchanges. Brokers can execute transactions for investment companies and
other large customers at a cost that is only a fraction of their commissions. The managers of a
substantial number of mutual funds own brokerage firms or are closely affiliated with them. In
most cases, the commissions generated by fund transactions are wholly retained by the affiliated
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contract,8 no court has determined whether the dollar amount of the advisory
fee may become large enough to constitute, by itself, a breach of section 36(b).
This Note examines the rationale of the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon
a fund's adviser with respect to its fees. Part I discusses the relevant history of
the 1970 amendments to the ICA and the need for a fiduciary standard
concerning the advisory fee. Part II addresses the issue of liability under
section 36(b), and finally, Part III analyzes the effect of the fiduciary standard
on whether a particular fee is excessive for the purposes of that section.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND OF SECTION 36(b)
A mutual fund is an investment company that purchases securities with the
capital contributed by its shareholders.9 Participation in a fund provides
relatively small investors with professional money management and the
advantages of a diverse portfolio of securities. 10 The most striking feature of
mutual funds is their external management structure." Although some funds
are "managed along conventional corporate lines by their own officers and
directors," most are managed by the investment advisers that also develop
and sponsor them. 12 The adviser, which is typically a partnership or a
corporation owned independently of the mutual fund it advises, "selects the
fund's portfolio and operates or supervises most other aspects of its business,"
including the appointment of the fund's directors, several of whom are usually
broker and therefore increase the compensation of the fund managers. The practice of using these
commissions to reduce fund advisory fees is known as recapture. SEC, Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as PPI]. For example, one of the issues in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976), was whether the adviser and affiliated directors of
American Investors Fund, Inc. breached their fiduciary duties by not informing the independent
directors of the fund that it might be possible to recapture brokerage commissions. Id. at 737.
8. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943(1978).
9. See Tannenbaumv. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402,405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); PPI,
supra note 7, at 33, 45. Investment companies are regulated by the SEC pursuant to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976). Generally, there are three types of investment
companies: management companies, face-amount certificate companies, and unit investment trusts.
Mutual funds are a form of management company. Face-amount certificate companies sell unsec-
ured, nonvoting debentures on an installment plan. Unit investment trusts sell interests in a fixed
group of securities held by a trustee. See PPI, supra note 7, at 37-39.
10. PPI, supra note 7, at 1. "Frequently cited reasons for the purchase of mutual fund shares
are the availability of expert investment advice, diversification of portfolio risks, convenience of
security management, and economy of bookkeeping activities, with the first two of particular
importance. Mutual funds, unlike most other financial institutions, tend to specialize in common
stock investment, and, as compared with the alternative of direct purchases of stock by people
with surplus funds, they provide a relatively easy means of diversifying risk which may be
particularly useful to small investors. From the standpoint of the economy as a whole, this
diversification of risk and widespread acceptance of the associated indirect investment in common
stock tends to lower the cost of equity capital and stimulate more risky undertakings, with a
higher average rate of return than would probably otherwise be realized for a given total
investment." Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep.
No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. x (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton Report].
11. PPI, supra note 7, at 45.
12. Id. at 8.
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officers or directors of the adviser.13 Control of a mutual fund, therefore, lies
with an external entity whose primary interest is maximization of its own
profits through the success of the fund. 14 The adviser receives a fee for its
services that is usually calculated as a percentage of the fund's total net
assets.' s As a consequence, mutual fund advisers are able to collect large
13. Id. at46; see Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402,405 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 934
(1977). In most cases, the adviser forms the fund and appoints the fund's directors. PPI, supra note 7,
at 46. The ICA defines two types of independent directors, unaffiliated and disinterested. A
person is an affiliated director of a fund if, among other things, he is an officer, director, partner
or employee of the fund's investment adviser, or if he owns five percent or more of the voting
shares in the adviser. Investment Company Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(3) (1976). A person
qualifies as a disinterested director of a mutual fund if he is not affiliated with the fund's adviser
or principal underwriter, and if he is not a member of the immediate family of a person affiliated
with the adviser or principal underwriter. Id. § 2(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19) (1976).
14. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977). "The
mutual fund, unique [among] all corporations, is the creature and the captive-I don't use these as
epithetical words, but as an objective description-is the creature and the captive of the manager, or
the adviser, as we know him. The adviser gives birth to the fund. The adviser peoples the fund with
its directors. The adviser's owners are the officers of the fund.
"That umbilical cord is never, never cut. That close, I might say incestuous relationship, Is there
for all time.
"In this relationship,... these men, and when I say'these men,'I mean the advisers and managers,
are both the givers and the receivers of astronomical amounts of money, moneys that run to $10
million a year and more by way of advisory fees, and lots more in the way of underwriting fees, et
cetera.
"These advisers, wearing the cloak of their directorial responsibilities as directors of the fund,
decide how much money to give themselves as investment advisers.
"There is nothing I have seen in my almost half century at the bar that even comes close to this
arrant form of undisciplined self-help. I think it was Cardozo who once said in a similar context in his
own inimitable prose, 'These men make themselves the beneficiaries of their own unrestricted
munificence,' at the expense, I might add, of the fund." Mutual Fund Amendments: Hearings on
H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 768 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Fund Hearings] (statement of Abraham Pomerantz).
15. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); PPI,
supra note 7, at 46. Therefore, the advisory fee fluctuates with the value of the fund's net assets and
provides some incentive for the adviser to work toward increases in fund value. Provision for a
specific fee must be contained in the advisory contract. Investment Company Act § 15(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 80a- 15(a)(1) (1976). It should be noted that a fund may receive a rebate on the adviser's fee If
the fund's expenses exceed a specified amount. Such funds must be reimbursed by their advisers to
the extent that the funds' ordinary operating expenses exceed a percentage of the funds' assets.
For example, Merrill Lynch Special Value Fund, Inc. (Special Value) had total net assets of
$53,265,205 as of March 31, 1979. Merrill Lynch Special Value Fund, Inc., Prospectus 30 (July
31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Special Value Prospectus] (on file with Fordham Law Review), The
fund's adviser was compensated at a rate of .75% of net assets which would have resulted In a fee
of $399,489. By operation of its expense ratio limitation, however, the fund was only obligated to
pay an advisory fee of $363,140. Id. at 31. Another fund, Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust
(Ready Assets), had total net assets of $1,635,273,693 as of December 31, 1978. Merrill Lynch
Ready Assets Trust, Prospectus 34 (May 29, 1979 (rev. Dec. 12, 1979)) [hereinafter cited as Ready
Assets Prospectus] (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The Ready Assets advisory fee was
calculated on a decreasing scale so that the fund paid the adviser at a rate of .50% on the first
$500 million of net assets, .425% for net assets exceeding $500 million but less than $750 million,
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advisory fees regardless of the cash value of the adviser's time and effort. 6
Moreover, the mutual fund structure provides ample opportunities for self-
dealing between the adviser and its affiliates. For example, the adviser
negotiates the terms of the advisory contract, including its fee, with the same
fund directors whom the adviser selected when it organized the fund.
In response to these problems, Congress enacted the ICA in 1940 to "mitigate
and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions... which adversely affect
the national public interest and the interest of investors."17 The objectionable
conditions within the investment industry that Congress sought to rectify in-
cluded: (1) the lack of adequate disclosure of information to purchasers and
owners of investment company securities;18 (2) the organization and manage-
ment of investment companies for the benefit of their managers rather than in the
interests of the fund's shareholders;1 9 (3) the use of discriminatory practices in the
issuance of securities to give preferential treatment to associates of the fund's
adviser; 20 (4) the use of unsound or misleading accounting principles by invest-
ment companies;21 (5) changes in fund investment policies and goals without
consent of its security holders; 22 (6) the use of excessive borrowing that unduly
increased the "speculative character" of the fund's portfolio; 23 and, (7) the
operation of investment companies "without adequate assets or reserves." 24
In 1958, concerned with the rapid growth of the mutual fund sector of the
investment industry, 25 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) au-
.375% of net assets exceeding $750 million but less than $1 billion, .355 of net assets exceeding
$1 billion but less than $1.5 billion, and .325% of net assets exceeding $1.5 billion but less than $2
billion. Id. at 12. Thus, the advisory fee would have been $6,689,639, but because of the expense
ratio limitations, the fund actually paid $4,361,393 in advisory fees in 1978. Id. at 36.
16. "Some of the advisers do excellent jobs; others, year after monotonousyear, do bad jobs. One
would expect that the advisers with good track records would replace the less efficient ones. Not at
all. The mutual fund investment adviser is the Sacred Cow of the corporate scene. If further proof is
needed that the investment adviser is permanent, indeed is a dynasty, it lies in this fact. Millions of
dollars are paid by sophisticated persons to buy advisory companies; the huge amounts paid are based
on the assumption that, come hell or high water, success or failure, their reign is forever. The
assumption has always been correct. Once an adviser, always an adviser." Fund Hearings, supra
note 14, at 787-88 (statement of Abraham Pomerantz).
17. Investment Company Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976).
18. Id. § 1(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (1976).
19. Id. § 1(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2) (1976).
20. Id. § 1(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(3) (1976).
21. Id. § 1(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I(b)(5) (1976).
22. Id. § 1(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(6) (1976).
23. Id. § 1(bX7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(7) (1976).
24. Id. § 1(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(8) (1976).
25. In 1958, the total value of mutual funds grew from $8.7 billion to $13.2 billion in one
year. PPI, supra note 7, at 2-3. "Between December 1952 and September 1958, the period
covered in detail in the [Wharton] study, the market value of the assets of open-end investment
companies again tripled, increasing from $4 to $12 billion. This increase in asset values of over
200 percent was accomplished by the formation and growth of a number of new funds, as well as
by the continued growth of funds in existence for the entire period. Of the $8.3 billion increase in
assets of the companies included iq the [Wharton] study, approximately $5.6 billion, or 67
percent, was supplied by net new money inflow from sales of investment company shares
(including reinvested capital gains), the net change in market values of portfolio holdings
1980]
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thorized the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce (Wharton) to study the
effectiveness of the ICA in relation to the growth of mutual funds. 26 Specifically,
Wharton examined the effects of a fund's size on its investment policies and its
performance.2 7 It concluded that "the more important current problems in the
mutual fund industry appear to be those which involve potential conflicts of
interest between fund management and shareholders, the possible absence of
arm's length bargaining between fund management and investment advisers,
and the impact of fund growth and stock purchases on stock prices. " 28 More-
over, investment advisers were not sharing with the fund shareholders the
economies of size that resulted from fund growth. 29 Most advisers tended to set
fees at a constant .50% of total net assets no matter how large the fund grew
rather than on a sliding scale that reduced fees as fund size increased. 30 At about
the same time that Wharton prepared its report and shortly after it was issued in
1962, several mutual fund shareholders commenced lawsuits based on allegedly
excessive advisory fees. Only three of these suits, however, were fully litigated. 3 1
In Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 32 the plaintiff, a shareholder of Chemical Fund,
Inc., claimed that F. Eberstadt & Co., the fund's adviser, was entitled to be
compensated only for time spent on Chemical's affairs and only at rates compa-
rable to the compensation of salaried executives with similar responsibilities. 33
The Delaware Chancery court rejected this view, however, and held that the
advisory fees were not excessive. 34 It noted that although most funds at that time
accounting for another $2.6 billion, or 31 percent of the total increase. The remaining $0.1 billion
represented increases in asset values resulting from absorptions of assets by mergers carried out
by members of the industry. Subsequent to September 1958, industry data indicate that mutual
fund assets continued to rise, increasing from $12 billion to almost $23 billion at the end of 1961,
with slightly over half this increase accounted for by net inflow." Wharton Report, supra note 10,
at 4 (footnotes omitted).
26. Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 1.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id. at x.
29. "Individual mutual fund shareholders do not pay higher management fee rates than they
would incur through other institutional investment channels (which, however, normally do not
involve a substantial sales charge). Nevertheless, they do not generally benefit from the lower
charges that the volume of their pooled resources might be expected to make possible. Mutual
funds without advisers were found to have relatively lower and more flexible advisory costs--a
situation which may be attributable, at least in part, to conventional limitations on salary
incomes (as opposed to payments to external organizations)." Id. at xin.
30. Id. at 28-29. "In an analysis of the relationships between investment advisers and mutual
funds, it was found that the effective fee rates charged the funds tend to cluster heavily about the
traditional rate of one-half of 1 percent per annum of average net assets, with approximately half
of the investment advisers charging exactly this rate. This concentration around the one-half of I
percent level occurs more or less irrespective of the size of a fund's assets managed by an
investment adviser, although operating expenses of the adviser were found to be generally lower
per dollar of income received, and also lower per dollar of assets managed, as the size of a fund's
assets increased." Id. at xii.
31. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474,
184 A.2d 602 (1962); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
32. 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
33. Id. at 565-66, 170 A.2d at 722.
34. Id. at 566-68, 170 A.2d at 722-23.
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were charged a fiat rate of .50% of total net assets, Chemical's fee included
breakpoint reductions from the basic rate, and therefore, was lower than the
average fee in the mutual fund industry. 35 Moreover, the court emphasized that
there could be no liability because Chemical's unaffiliated directors36 and share-
holders had approved the compensation agreement. 3"
One year after Meiselman, several shareholders of Fundamental Investors,
Inc. contended that the advisory fee rate of .50% charged on that fund's assets
of almost $600 million was excessive. 38 In Saxe v. Brady,39 Chancellor Seitz
ruled that because the shareholders ratified the advisory contract they had to
prove that "no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would be
expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for
the value which was given."'40 The plaintiffs argued that other comparable
funds paid significantly lower advisory fees4' and that Fundamental's adviser
was earning a profit of approximately two million dollars. 42 In response to
these arguments, the Chancellor observed that
profits are certainly approaching the point where they are outstripping any reasonable
relationship to expenses and effort even in a legal sense. And this is so even after making
due allowance for incentive and benefit presumably conferred. This is not to say that no
payment is justified after a fund reaches a particular size. It is only to say that the business
community might reasonably expect that at some point those representing the fund would
see that the management fee was adjusted to reflect the diminution in the cost factor. 43
Nevertheless, the court held that the fees were not excessive because the plain-
tiffs had failed to prove that the fees represented a waste of corporate assets."4
Corporate waste was the only legal standard upon which the court could base a
conclusion that the fees were excessive.
In the third case, Acampora v. Birkland,41 the plaintiffs argued that the
advisory fee of .50% of net assets charged to Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. was
excessive because the fund received fewer services than other funds.46 The
district court held, on the basis of Saxe and Meiselman, that the fee was not
excessive because it was not "unconscionable and shocking."4' Although the
35. Id. at 567-68, 170 A.2d at 723.
36. See note 13 supra.
37. 39 Del. Ch. at 568, 170 A.2d at 723 (1961).
38. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 488, 184 A.2d 602, 611 (1962).
39. 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
40. Id. at 486, 184 A.2d at 610. Chancellor Seitz stated: "Where waste of corporate assets is
alleged, the court, notwithstanding independent stockholder ratification, must examine the facts
of the situation. Its examination, however, is limited solely to discovering whether what the
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid. If it can be said that ordinary
businessmen might differ on the sufficiency of the terms, then the court must validate the
transaction." Id.
41. Id. at 490, 184 A.2d at 612.
42. Id. at 492-93, 184 A.2d at 614.
43. Id. at 498, 184 A.2d at 616-17.
44. Id., 184 A.2d at 617.
45. 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
46. Id. at 547-48.
47. Id. at 549.
1980]
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court stated that a percent of net assets fee "leaves a great deal to be desired" it
could not determine whether the amount paid pursuant to that formula was
excessive because "it is impossible to evaluate the service rendered. '48
Despite the Wharton finding that fund advisers did not share existing econo-
mies of size with fund investors, 49 the refusal of the courts to proscribe these
practices severely hampered mutual fund shareholders in their efforts to benefit
from those savings. The criticism of the existing system rendered in Saxe50
prompted many fund advisers to incorporate breakpoints in their fees as a means
to settle the pending derivative lawsuits. 5 ' Fund shareholders were forced to
accept modest settlements, however, because no plaintiffs succeeded in advisory
fee litigation.5 2
As a consequence of the Wharton findings, and the failure of any plaintiffs to
prevail in advisory fee litigation, the SEC began a study of investment company
growth in 1966. 53 The SEC concluded that the ICA worked well to remedy the
conditions addressed by Congress in 1940.54 Nevertheless, because of growth
and changes in the industry the SEC was alarmed by the cost to investors of
participation in mutual funds.55
One of the major aspects of mutual funds that the SEC addressed was the cost
of advisory services. In particular, the SEC determined that the external man-
agement structure of the mutual fund industry was an obstacle to any share-
holder benefit from decreased management costs.5 6 It found, for example, that
investment advisers "seldom, if ever, compete[d] with each other for advisory
contracts with mutual funds."'57 As a result, fund shareholders were effectively
prevented from shopping around for another adviser charging a lower fee.5 8
The SEC also noted that not only did the lack of free market competition
among investment advisers serve to discourage lower advisory fees, but share-
holder awareness of the possibility of obtaining savings from lower advisory fees
was minimized by their interest in other factors such as sales charges,5 9 invest-
48. Id. at 548-49. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not challenge the form of the calculation,
merely that the fees charged were not an accurate representation of the services provided by the
adviser. Id.
49. Wharton Report, supra note 10, at xil.
50. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 497-98, 184 A.2d 602, 616-17 (1962); see note 43 supra
and accompanying text.
51. PPI, supra note 7, at 138.
52. Id. at 83.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1; see Investment Company Act § 1, 13 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976).
55. PPI, supra note 7, at 1.
56. Id. "These findings suggest that the special structural characteristics of the mutual fund
industry, with an external adviser closely affiliated with the management of the mutual fund,
tend to weaken the bargaining position of the fund in the establishment of advisory fee rates.
Other clients have effective alternatives, and the rates charged them are more clearly Influenced
by the force of competition." Wharton Report, supra note 10, at Xxll.
57. PPI, supra note 7, at 126-27.
58. Id.
59. The sales load can be of greater significance than the advisory fee to a cost-conscious
investor. A sales load is the sales charge exacted from mutual fund investors when they purchase
fund shares. It is usually the difference between the net asset value of a fund share and Its
purchase price. Therefore, because the sales load is first deducted from the purchase price, an
[Vol. 48
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ment performance, 60 and selling efforts on behalf of the fund. 61 The SEC
observed that the prospect of paying another sales charge and, possibly, a
capital gains tax is likely to deter someone who already is a mutual fund investor
from switching to another fund with a lower advisory fee. 6 2 Thus, the effect of
the external management structure of mutual funds is such that even cost-
conscious investors have few incentives to learn that fees are excessive or to
pressure the fund's adviser for lower advisory fees.
Similarly, the SEC found that the disclosure requirements of the ICA did not
provide sufficient protection for fund shareholders. It suggested that, despite an
adviser's compliance with the statutory disclosure provisions, 63 the reasonable-
ness of charges for the "entire package" of services provided by the adviser, its
affiliates, and other professional, administrative and clerical personnel to fund
investors is perhaps too complex for an effective evaluation by them. 64 The SEC
also stated that "[t]o the extent that disclosure has served to develop and
maintain conventional limitations on the level of advisory fees .. . . these
limitations have served mainly to keep advisory fee rates from rising" above
traditional industry levels rather than to force fees down when economies of size
occur.
65 It concluded, therefore, that the Wharton finding that advisory fees
clustered around .50% of total net assets in the late 1950's "was less true-but not
uncommon" in 1965.66 Moreover, the SEC noted that although more funds
investor does not obtain an interest in the fund equal in value to the amount he pays for his
shares. Id. at 52. Although some funds sell their shares at net asset value (no-load), the majority
of mutual funds charge a sales load. Id. at 204.
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The ICA requires advisers to disclose all information that may reasonably be necessary
to evaluate the terms of an advisory contract. Investment Company Amendments Act § 15(c), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976).
64. PPI, supra note 7, at 128. "Appraisal of the fairness of the charges for the entire package
of these services is far more complex than an appraisal of the reasonableness of individual
executives' compensation. The Wharton Report suggested the lower management costs of the
internally managed companies may reflect the restraining influence of conventional limitations on
executives salaries. But even here the restraints may have been weakened by the industry
pattern of fees paid by the externally managed companies." Id. (footnote omitted). Furthermore, in
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961), Chancellor Seitz observed that a
comparison between mutual fund advisory fees and compensation of salaried executives for
similar services will not conclusively establish that a fee is excessive. Id. at 567-68, 170 A.2d at
722-23.
65. PPI, supra note 7, at 128. "With respect to the information requirements of the
Investment Company Act, shareholders receive considerable factual data in mutual fund prospec-
tuses and reports, and in whatever information is provided them by mutual fund salesmen.
Whether this provides them with an adequate basis for evaluating performance, management
fees, and the disposition of brokerage business, in the absence of some framework for appraisal
(including comparative information) is an open question. It is also possible that in spite of the
information provided, mutual fund shareholders are led by the structure of formal relationships
into supposing that their fund is a truly independent organization, whose officers and directors
negotiate at arm's length on their behalf with the investment adviser in fixing fees, deciding on
brokerage allocations, continuing his services based on an appraisal of the adequacy of perfor-
mance, etc." Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 33 (footnote omitted).
66. PPI, supra note 7, at 97; see note 30 supra.
19801
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obtained scaled down rates in 1965,67 fee reductions were not substantial be-
cause of concurrent increases in fund assets. 68
The SEC further determined that shareholder voting rights required by the
ICA also proved to be an ineffective means by which investors could obtain
savings on fees. 69 The ICA requires shareholder approval of the advisory con-
tract and its annual renewal by either the shareholders or the board of direc-
tors. 70 Nevertheless, these ratification requirements do not give shareholders
any practical control over the advisory fee. Shareholders can only ratify or reject
advisory contracts already adopted by management. Because the fund derives its
identity from the adviser, shareholders cannot ultimately reject the advisory
contract. 71 Moreover, shareholder rejection of a proposed contract pressures the
adviser, directors and shareholders to reach agreement on a fee before the old
contract expires, and potentially harms the fund because it might be left with no
one to manage its investments. The ICA prohibits anyone from serving "as an
investment adviser to a registered investment company except pursuant to a
written contract. 72 Therefore, fund shareholders cannot, as a practical matter,
use their voting rights to control directly the advisory fee rate because they may
simultaneously jeopardize their own interests.
The ICA also provides for shareholder election of fund directors. 73 This right,
however, is also an inadequate means of controlling fees. Fund shares tend to be
owned by more individuals and in smaller amounts than securities of other
publicly held enterprises. 74 Therefore, it is extremely difficult for fund share-
67. PPI, supra note 7, at 97-100.
68. Id. at 102.
69. Id. at 130. The SEC determined that "shareholder voting [rights] can serve as an
important method of communication with management. Indications of shareholder dissatisfaction
expressed in this way may play a significant role in influencing the actions of fund managers on
many matters of policy. But shareholder voting rights cannot be used effectively to obtain
departures from traditional fees that inadequately reflect the economies of size in the management
of investment companies or with respect to other matters that affect so crucially the interests of
the adviser and those who are affiliated with it." Id.
70. Investment Company Act § 15(a),(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a),(c) (1976).
71. The Merrill Lynch mutual funds are an example of how funds are identified with their
advisers. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. sponsors Merrill Lynch Ready Assets
Trust, Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, Merrill Lynch Special Value Fund, Inc. and CMA
Money Trust. Either Fund Assets Management, Inc. or Merrill Lynch Assets Management, Inc.
serves as investment adviser to these funds. Ready Assets Prospectus, supra note 15, at 11;
Special Value Prospectus, supra note 15, at 9; Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, Prospectus
15 (Sept. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MBF Prospectus] (on file with the Fordham Law Review);
CMA Trust, Prospectus 11 (July 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CMA Prospectus] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). Both of the advisers are wholly owned subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch, and
several people serve as principal executive officers and directors of both advisers. Compare Ready
Assets Prospectus, supra note 15, at 12 with Special Value Prospectus, supra note 15, at 9.
72. PPI, supra note 7, at 129 (footnote omitted); see Investment Company Act § 15(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1976).
73. Investment Company. Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1976).
74. PPI, supra note 7, at 129-30; Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 53-57. "The shares of
stock of open-end companies are more widely distributed and less concentrated in ownership than
those of most other types of financial and nonfinancial institutions of comparable size. In 1958 the
median number of shareholders of open-end companies was almost 9,000; and in the case of only
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holders to reach agreement or to collect sufficient votes to elect directors they
choose as well as to adopt their own advisory fee proposals.
The role of independent directors"S of funds as a means of reducing advisory
fees has also had questionable effect. 76 The ICA required that at least forty
percent of a fund's board of directors not be directly or indirectly affiliated with
the fund's adviser.7 7 The provision for independent directors limited an adviser's
direct control over a fund by imposing adequate representation of shareholder
interests on the fund's board.7 8
Typically, a fund's independent directors are selected by the original organiz-
ers of the fund or its successive managements. 79 As a result, independent
directors are likely to feel obligated, or at least sympathetic, to the adviser,8 0 and
therefore, they might be reluctant to challenge vigorously the adviser's re-
quests. 1 Even if the independent directors are truly independent, however, they
must rely on the adviser or persons employed by the adviser for the information
3 of the 47 companies with assets exceeding $50 million was there a record owner holding as
much as 5 percent of the outstanding shares. This wide distribution of mutual fund shares reflects
the fact that they have been attractive to relatively small investors. Over two-thirds of the
number of the largest shareholdings (those among the largest 20) of open-end companies were
owned by individuals, for the most part directly, but also as beneficial owners of record holdings
of trustees, nominees, and brokers." Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
75. See note 13 supra.
76. The ICA requires that no more than 60% of the board of directors of a registered
investment company be affiliated persons in the company. Investment Company Act § 10(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976); see note 13 supra.
77. PPI, supra note 7, at 130; Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 769 (statement of Abraham
Pomerantz).
78. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 789 (current version at AS
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976)); see note 13 supra.
79. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1211 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441
U.S. 471 (1979).
80. "The fact is that these independent directors are handpicked by the advis[er]... [alnd it
is not surprising that they are not selected for, nor do they exhibit, fearlessness or truculence."
Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 788 (statement of Abraham Pomerantz). In Lasker v. Burks,
567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), Judge Lumbard was suspicious of the
independence of the unaffiliated directors: "In the ordinary routine of running an investment
trust, the disinterested directors must constantly deal with interested directors in a spirit of
accommodation. Indeed, they are compelled for the most part to rely on the information and
expert advice provided by the adviser and the majority directors." 567 F.2d at 1212 (footnote
omitted). The Supreme Court, however, tempered Judge Lumbard's conclusion by observing that
"it is not a conclusion of law required by the ICA." 441 U.S. at 485 n.15. The Court reasoned
that "Congress surely would not have entrusted such critical functions as approval of advisory
contracts and selection of accountants to the statutorily disinterested directors had it shared the
Court of Appeals' view that such directors could never be 'disinterested' where their codirectors or
investment advisers were concerned." Id. See also Note, Mutual Fund Independent Directors:
Putting a Leash on the Watchdogs, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 568, 574 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Independent Directors).
81. The SEC general counsel has noted that "[the independent director] is probably reluctant
to exercise [his power] in a vigorous way, because, after all, it's unpleasant to [reprimand] the
people that he has worked with for years and likes and respects-and probably that's the only
reason that he's on the board; he wouldn't accept the job if he didn't like and respect them."
Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 663, 759 (1967) (statement of Philip Loomis);
see Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 768-69 (statement of Abraham Pomerantz).
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about fund operations that is necessary for decisions that set fund policy. 82 This
dependence limits an independent director's ability to make informed decisions
concerning the advisory fee. Furthermore, the independent directors do not have
a realistic alternative to acceptance of the advisory contract sought by the
adviser.
The possibility of disrupting the fund's operations, the prospect of a bitter and expensive
proxy contest, and the risk and uncertainty involved in replacing the entire fund man-
agement organization with a new and untested one, make termination of the existing
advisory relationship a wholly unrealistic alternative in negotiations over advisory fees.
Without such an alternative, advisory fees negotiated between advisers and the un-
affiliated directors lack the essential element of arm's-length transactions and provide
inadequate assurance that the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the price at which
similar services could be obtained in a genuinely competitive market.8 3
Accordingly, the SEC proposed a standard designed to "measure the fairness" of
adviser's fees.84 The SEC recommended that the ICA be amended to provide
that compensation paid by the fund to any person affiliated with the investment
adviser for advisory services be reasonable 5s
The conclusions and recommendations in the Wharton report and those of the
SEC presented Congress with a comprehensive view of the inadequacies regard-
ing mutual fund advisory fees inherent in the ICA. Beginning in 1967, Congress
undertook a revision of the ICA to remedy the industry conditions that were
adverse to fund and shareholder interests. Dissatisfied with the Saxe v. Brady
standard of corporate waste or that of gross abuse of trust specified in the
ICA, Congress considered a series of amendments that evolved into section
36(b). The amendment imposes a fiduciary duty on the adviser with respect to
compensation received for its services. 86 Congress intended this statutory duty
82. PPI, supra note 7, at 130-31. "They also have no staff of officers and employees who work
for and are compensated by the fund. In most cases, even the fund's counsel is the adviser's
counsel as well." Id. at 130.
83. Id. at 131.
84. Id. at 143.
85. Id. at 144. "Before arriving at its recommendations the Commission had considered
carefully a number of other choices for providing such protections. These ranged from proposals
for strengthening the existing safeguards of disclosure, shareholder voting rights and the role of
unaffiliated directors to those for complete disaffiliation of the funds from their adviser-
underwriters and the compulsory internalization of the management function. The former
proposals were rejected as being wholly unrealistic, and, in the Commission's view, the latter
appear too sweeping at this time." Id. at 147.
86. In 1967, H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Investment Company Act
Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
3-19 (1967) and S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Mutual Fund Legislation of
1967: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 897
(1967), were introduced in Congress. They contained amendments of the ICA that required that
the compensation received for services rendered to a mutual fund be reasonable. In 1968, the
Senate considered and passed S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Cong. Rec. 23544-52 (1968),
which provided that advisory fees be reasonable. The same bill was reintroduced in 1969 and
designated S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1969: Hearings on S. 34 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 215-87 (1969). The mutual fund industry, however, continuously opposed the form of the
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to provide an "effective means for the courts to act" when the SEC or
investors allege that advisory fees are excessive.8 7 It remains to be seen,
however, whether the amendment adequately satisfies the Congressional
purpose.
11. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 36 OF THE ICA
As enacted in 1940, section 36 of the ICA provided for SEC suits against
officers, directors, members of any advisory board, investment advisers, de-
positors or principal underwriters who engaged in practices that constituted
"gross abuse of trust. '8 8 Congress intended to remedy some of the instances of
self dealing found to exist in the mutual fund industry, such as the organization
and management of investment companies for the benefit of the adviser or the
preferential treatment of associates of the fund's adviser.8 9 In 1970, Congress
designated the existing provisions of section 36 as subsection (a) and replaced the
gross abuse of trust standard with a breach of "fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct." 90 Breach of this duty may result, among other things, in an
injunction against the defendant that prohibits him from serving the mutual
fund in whatever capacity he occupied. 9 1 Moreover, Congress required that
independent directors be disinterested regarding the adviser, rather than un-
affiliated. 92 The effect of this change was to "supply an independent check on
management" by "stiffening the requirement of independence" when the
"affiliated person" provision of the ICA appeared to be inadequate. 93 The
purpose of the amendment was to impose a stricter standard of care on the
independent directors than had previously been required. 94
management fee amendments. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip
Loomis, Gen. Counsel, SEC). Although no one objected to the basic proposition that manage-
ment fees should be reasonable and that the bill should change the standard of gross abuse of
trust in § 36 to a more realistic standard, industry members felt that the fiduciary standard would
adversely affect the quality of fund management by forcing advisers to lower their fees and
remove their incentive to encourage fund growth. Id. at 531 (statement of Raymond Cocchi).
They also feared that the standard would create too much litigation over fees. Id. After discussing
the matter with investment industry representatives, the SEC drafted and submitted H.R. 1199s,
S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 4-59, which
contained the fiduciary duty standard rather than the requirement that compensation for advisory
services be reasonable.
87. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report],
reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4897, 4898.
88. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976).
89. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
90. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976)).
91. Section 36(a) provides in pertinent part: "If such allegations are established, the court may
enjoin such persons from acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be reasonable and appropriate in
the circumstances, having due regard to the protection ofjinvestors and to the effectuation of the
policies . . . of this title." Investment Company Act § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976).
92. See note 13 supra.
93. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979).
94. Independent Directors, supra note 80, at 574.
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Congress also added section 36(b) to the ICA which specifies that the SEC or
any shareholder may bring an action on the fu nd's behalf against the investment
adviser as well as against any officer, director, member of any advisory board,
depositor, or principal underwriter of the investment company who, under the
circumstances, may also have a fiduciary duty in respect to the payments
received by the adviser. 95 When it reported the section to Congress, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency noted that "[tlhe fiduciary duty of the...
adviser is extended not only to compensation paid to the investment adviser but
also to payments made by the investment company or its shareholders to an
affiliated person." 96 Congress, therefore, intended to provide a "remedy if the
investment adviser should try to evade liability by arranging for payments to be
made not to the adviser itself but to an affiliated person of the adviser. '97
Furthermore, an affiliated director of the fund who is also an officer of the
adviser can be liable to the fund under section 3 6(b) because the salary he receives
as an officer of the adviser can be traced to advisory fee payments by the fund. 98
Nevertheless, although the scope of this duty is broad, Congress barred its
application to actions maintained against anyone other than a recipient of
compensation for advisory services. 99
In contrast to the broad application of section 36(b), damages recoverable for
breach of that fiduciary duty are limited. The fund can only recover "actual
damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty,"' 00 and the damages
may not exceed the amount of payments received by the defendant.10' The
requirements serve the traditional remedial goals of restitution and restoration
by returning to the investors any of the adviser's unjust enrichment caused by
his breach of duty. ' 0 2
The fiduciary standard set forth in the 1970 amendments provides mutual
fund shareholders with sufficient safeguards to protect their interests in advisory
fee negotiations in three ways. First, the legislative history of section 36(b) makes
it clear that an investment adviser must deal with fund shareholders as if they
were at arm's length. The report of the hearings before the House Subcommittee
on Commerce and Finance, which considered the proposed ICA amendments,
stipulates that a fiduciary may not use his power to benefit himself at the expense
of shareholders "no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical require-
ments." 0 3 By imposing this responsibility on investment advisers and their
95. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976)).




99. Investment Company Act § 36(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1976); see Halligan v.
Standard & Poor's/Intercapital, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. Investment Company Act § 35(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1976).
101. Id.
102. See Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1970); SEC v. Quing N. Wong, 252
F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966).
103. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 190 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939))). See also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
Significantly, both Congress and the SEC recognized that advisers owed a fiduciary obligation to
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affiliates, Congress undoubtedly intended that advisers must deal fairly with
shareholders. 1
0 4
Second, the language of section 36(b) shifts the focus of any fee litigation from
the fund's directors to the amount of the fee received and the adviser's role as a
fiduciary. This change in perspective, although not an insulation of the fund's
directors from liability under section 36(b), los ensures that litigation will test the
fairness of the advisory fee regardless of the directors' approval. ' 0 6 Moreover,
this policy shift represents an affirmative attempt to depart from the unsatisfac-
tory results of Saxe v. Brady, 107 Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 108 and Acampora v.
Birkland. 0 9
Third, shareholders receive protection under the 1970 amendments because
their ratification of the advisory contract is now only one of several factors to be
considered by the court in adjudicating the fairness of an advisory fee. I 10 This
change precludes the result reached in Saxe v. Brady I I ' and requires the court to
examine all services rendered to the fund in exchange for the adviser's fee. 11.
Therefore, when the "package" of services provided to the fund by an adviser
and its affiliates is too complex for an effective evaluation by the shareholders, "13
the court may weigh their ratification of the advisory contract and can disregard
it entirely to determine the fairness of the fee.
II. EFFECT OF THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD ON THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE ADVISER'S FEE Is FAIR
Although the fiduciary concept is firmly established in the common law, the
effect of this standard on the amount of an advisory fee is an open ques-
tion.11 4 The courts that have interpreted the amended statute have ruled that
fund shareholders under the ICA. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 189; see SEC v. Insurance
Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir. 1958); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 238-40
(S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). The 1970 amendments manifest Congress' intent
that charging excessive or unreasonable fees constitutes a breach of an adviser's duty regardless of
shareholder ratification. See Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188, 190 (memorandum of Philip
Loomis, Gen. Counsel, SEC). See also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir. 1971). crt.
dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).




107. 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
108. 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
109. 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
110. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
111. 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
112. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
113. PPI, supra note 7, at 128.
114. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
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the section 36(b) standard incorporates the common law standard for
fiduciaries, " 5 and thus, the adviser owes his undivided loyalty to the fund he
serves. 116 Courts still must decide, however, when a fee is excessive, or
whether a fee that was initially reasonable has become excessive, and there-
fore, breaches the fiduciary duty merely because the fund's assets have grown.
A court can either examine the dollar amount of the fee alone and determine if
it is reasonable for advisory services in the industry, or scrutinize the
procedure by which the fee was determined. 117
When the analysis of a claim that the advisory fee is excessive is limited to a
consideration of the dollar amount of the fee, Congress' intention to provide an
effective test of the fee's fairness will not be satisfied. 118 Such a limited analysis
does not permit an evaluation of the advisory fee beyond questioning whether the
fund's directors followed reasonable business judgment in approving the fee. 119
To follow the business judgment standard for the examination of the dollar
amount of the fee, a court must validate the advisory fee if "ordinary busi-
nessmen might differ on the sufficiency of the terms.' 120 This analysis does not
delve as deeply as the fiduciary standard into whether a fee is excessive because
fund directors sometimes breach their section 36(b) responsibility even though
they reached a reasonable business judgment about the adviser's fee. 12' For
example, in Galfand v. Chestnutt, 122 the district court reasoned that the in-
terested directors were not "improperly motivated" in their desire to improve the
adviser's profits by reducing the possibility of a rebate to the fund. 123 Neverthe-
less, the court held that "to do so without full disclosure [to the unaffiliated
directors] and discussion of [the adviser's] financial condition.. .was inappro-
priate.'1 24
Following the business judgment rule, 125 the district court in Galfand would
have been precluded from finding that the interested directors breached their
section 36(b) duty because the court first concluded that their action was reason-
115. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 416 n.20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934
(1977); Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 811 n.10 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
943 (1978); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1975);
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).
116. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 811 ,2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
943 (1978); see Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
117. See Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen.
Counsel, SEC).
118. Senate Report, supra note 87, at 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad, News
4897, 4898.
119. See, e.g., Saye v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 600, 610 (1962).
120. Id.
121. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text. See also Independent Directors, supra
note 80, at 576.
122. 402 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd sub nom. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978).
123. Id. at 1328.
124. Id. The ICA requires the Independent directors to "request and evaluate" any Informa-
tion reasonably necessary to evaluate the advisory contract. The investment adviser Is under a
commensurate duty to supply such information to the directors. Investment Company Act § 15(c),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976).
125. See note 40 supra.
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able. 126 Furthermore, to review the directors' business judgment, the court must
compare the contested rate or dollar amount to those of other mutual funds. '2 If
a court makes this comparison and holds that an adviser's fee is excessive,' 28 it
must assume that all advisory fees for all funds are excessive at that amount or
higher, regardless of the differences in the various funds' investment policies and
service requirements. In enacting section 36(b), however, Congress recognized
that advisory fee levels at which a breach of fiduciary duty occur cannot be
defined specifically due to the variations among mutual funds. 29 A comparison
of the fees alone, therefore, does not determine the fairness of the challenged
advisory fee.
Alternatively, a court might scrutinize all of the facts that relate to the
determination and payment of the adviser's fee. This type of analysis, which was
contemplated by Congress,130 avoids the shortcomings of the purely mathemat-
ical approach. As stated by the SEC General Counsel in 1969, the factors that
should be considered under this preferred evaluation of the fee include: (1) "[tlhe
nature, quality and extent of the service to be rendered"; 1 3 (2) "the extent to
which economies of scale and common management [in the case of a fund
complex]132 were shared with the fund"; 133 (3) whether "comparable charges
[were] made by the adviser" to other investors and whether those charges are
prevalent within the fund industry; 34 (4) "the value of all other benefits
126. Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Galfand
v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978).
127. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 488-96, 184 A.2d 602, 611-15 (1962).
128. See id.
129. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 200 (answer of Hamer Budge, Chairman, SEC, to
written questions of Rep. Keith).
130. Senate Report, supra note 87, at 15, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4897, 4909.
131. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
132. Fund complexes are groups of funds which have different types of investment policies
and are under a common management. PPI, supra note 7, at 47. For example, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. sponsors Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, Merrill Lynch
Municipal Bond Fund, Merrill Lynch Special Value Fund, Inc., and CMA Money Trust. Not
only do these funds share the same Merrill Lynch advisers, see note 71 supro, but their
investment objectives often overlap. For example, Ready Assets and CMA invest in short term
U.S. Government securities, bank certificates of deposit, and short term corporate debt securities.
Ready Assets Prospectus, supra note 15, at 2; CMA Prospectus, supra note 71, at 6. MBF invests
in state, municipal and public authority bonds, MBF Prospectus, supra note 71, at 3, and Special
Value invests in a diversified portfolio of securities of small and emerging growth companies in an
effort to provide fund investors with long term growth of capital. Special Value Prospectus, supra
note 15, at 2. "Fund complexes enable a mutual fund adviser to reach a broader cross section of
potential investors and to offer each investor the opportunity to apportion his aggregate mutual
fund investment among several funds with different investment objectives all managed by the
same adviser." PPI, supra note 7, at 47. Although complexes may cause substantial economies of
size to accrue to the fund managers due to overlapping portfolios and common investment advice
for the various funds in the complex, advisory fees "seldom give express recognition to these
economies on a complex-wide basis." Id. at 108.
133. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
134. Id. Wharton observed that "[aldvisory fee rates charged mutual funds tended to be
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received" by the fund;' 35 (5) whether the directors approved and the sharehold-
ers ratified the advisory fee agreement; 136 (6) whether there was complete and
effective disclosure of all pertinent information by the adviser; 3 7 and, (7)
whether the deliberations of the directors were a matter of substance or a more
formality. 138 By examining these factors a court can determine the fairness of the
adviser's fee in light of all the circumstances surrounding its incorporation into
the advisory contract.
When a fund does succeed in achieving its investment objectives, the perfor-
mance of the fund tends to support a finding that an advisory fee is fair. If the
success and growth of the fund occur for reasons other than the advisory skills of
the adviser, however, the fee should be subjected to closer inspection. Scrutiny is
necessary because these factual situations give rise to economies of size' 3 9 that
should, to some extent, be passed on to the shareholders. 140 The existence of
lower fees paid by investors in funds of a similar size or those paid by investors to
substantially higher than those charged by the same advisers to the aggregate of their clients other
than investment companies, for comparable asset level.. In 45 percent of the cases examined of
mutual fund advisers with other clients, the effective fee rate charged mutual funds was two or
more times that of the aggregate of other clients. Advisory fee rates of mutual funds also tended
to exceed substantially the effective management costs of open-end companies without advisers.
Adviser rates to open-end companies were also found to be less flexible in relation to size of assets
managed than rates charged other clients (as well as the effective management costs of companies
without advisers)." Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 29 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore,
Wharton noted that the higher rates charged fund clients did not "appear to be a consequence of
extensive services rendered to, or expenses incurred on behalf of, mutual funds." Id. Wharton
based this conclusion on "the fact that fee rates charged open-end companies were frequently
relatively high even where the expenses absorbed by the adviser were small" and "the fact that,
with comparable services provided to mutual funds without investment advisers, management
costs tended to be lower." Id. (footnotes omitted). The most decisive factor, however, was that
"[e]xpense ratios were found to be sharply higher for those advisory firms which received income
from both investment company and other clients. . . . E]xpense ratios increased with increases
in the proportion of total income received from noninvestment company clients for most size
classes of assets managed." Id. (footnotes omitted).
135. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188. (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
136. Investment Company Act § 36(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976); Fund Hearings,
supra note 14, at 189; Senate Report, supra note 87, at 15. The Act provides that this factor shall
be given such weight as the court deems appropriate under the circumstances. Investment
Company Act § 35(bX2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976).
137. The investment adviser must furnish to the fund's board "such information as may
reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes
regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of such company." Investment Company Act §
15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976). See also Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
824 (1975); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
138. Senate Report, supra note 87, at 15, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4897, 4909-10.
139. PPI, supra note 14, at 188; Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 30.
140. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 188 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC); Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 30.
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advisers for analogous services is some evidence that the contested fee is un-
fair. 14 ' The court should also consider any other benefits and services that the
adviser provides to the fund in exchange for the advisory fee. "These include
brokerage services, safekeeping of ... securities .... receipt and delivery of
securities , . . , receipt of dividend and interest income, [and preparation of]
proxy material .... ,,142 In addition, some funds provide benefits such as
retirement plans14 3 and checking privileges. 1 These services vary from fund
to fund and their relative values should be reflected in the advisory fee.
The fiduciary duty imposed by section 36(b) provides a measure of fairness for
plaintiffs and defendants in advisory fee litigation. Moreover, a comprehensive
test for the breach of that duty allows shareholders to challenge the advisory fee
despite prior shareholder ratification when other circumstances provide evi-
dence of overreaching by the fiduciary. 14s This test also recognizes, however,
that the adviser has a right to make a profit from its contract with the fund. 14 6
Even large profits for the adviser may be essential to the continued growth and
wellbeing of a mutual fund because they serve as incentives for the adviser to
maintain diligent management practices.'
47
Conflict between these interests occurs, for example, when a potential investor
who read the fund's prospectus to learn the rate of advisory compensation
purchases fund shares. If the fund's net assets increase greatly during the year for
which that rate is effective, 14 8 the adviser will undoubtedly receive a much larger
fee than he did in the previous year. 14 9 In a derivative suit in which the
shareholder alleges that the fee is excessive, the court must decide whether the
fee has become so large that the initial shareholder approval is now insig-
nificant.' 50 This problem can be resolved by examining the nature, quality
and extent of the advisory services. When the fund grows large because the
adviser carefully selected and managed the fund's portfolio, it seems inequita-
ble to allow shareholders who originally approved of the rate of compensation
and who have benefited from the fund's growth to later challenge its success.
This is especially so if the adviser and the affiliated directors fully disclosed all
141. Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 29; PPI, supra note 7, at 97.
142. PPI, supra note 7, at 86.
143. See, e.g., Ready Assets Prospectus, supra note 15, at 21-23.
144. See, e.g., id. at 15-16.
145. Investment Company Act § 36(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976),
146. Fund Hearings, supra note 14, at 189 (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen. Counsel,
SEC).
147. See Senate Report, supra note 87, at 4, reprinted in [19701 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4897, 4899-900.
148. Section 15(a)(2) provides that an advisory contract continuing in effect for more than two
years from the date of its execution must be approved at least annually by the directors or by the
shareholders. Investment Company Act § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (1976).
149. Such a phenomenon may occur with the Ready Assets Trust. As of December 31, 1978,
Ready Assets had net assets of over $1.6 billion. Ready Assets Prospectus, supra note 15, at 34.
On February 27, 1980, however, the fund's net assets totalled $10.66 billion. N.Y. Times, Feb.
29, 1980, § D, at 6, col. 6. Therefore, even though the fee breakpoints and the expense ratio
limitation, see note 15 supra, may provide some abatement, the dollar amount of the advisory fee
payable by the fund has increased significantly in the last year.
150. See note 126 supra.
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material facts, and if the adviser did not exert any improper influence upon
the independent directors during negotiations of the fee. The same is true
when a fund shareholder votes in favor of the rate agreed upon by the
directors and the adviser. On the other hand, the SEC observed in 1966 that
many funds achieve substantial fund growth through the sale of fund shares
rather than through a capital gain in the value of portfolio holdings. In some
cases a fund's investments represent less than one hundred percent of the
fund's net assets, and therefore, the adviser has a smaller portfolio to manage
than most shareholders might believe. 151 Thus, when the fund grows due to
factors other than the quality of the advisory services, a court should be more
inclined to conclude that a relatively larger fee is unfair despite shareholder
ratification of the advisory contract.15 2
It should also be noted that under the proposed analysis disclosure of the
pertinent information required by the ICAI S3 is another factor that a court must
consider. The criteria for adequate disclosure under section 36(b), have already
been established by the courts. In Fogel v. Chestnutt, IS4 for example, the Second
Circuit ruled that the adviser is required to disclose information to the un-
affiliated directors whenever there is a possible conflict between the director's
interests and those of the fund and its shareholders. Is' The information disclosed
must also be sufficient to enable the directors "to participate effectively in the
management of the investment company."' 5 6 To satisfy this requirement the
151. See PPI, supra note 7, at 95; Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 405-08. Wharton
questioned "whether there may not be a conflict of interest between mutual fund shareholders and
their investment adviser in respect of the effort that should be devoted to selling shares. The
benefits to the adviser of more or less indefinite growth by intensive selling are fairly obvious.
Without a scaled management fee rate the advantage of such growth to the shareholders In the
form of cost reductions is sharply restricted. A priori it has been argued that shareholders benefit
from increased diversification [of] risk and the ability of the adviser to afford more substantial
facilities and able personnel; but it has been pointed out on the other side that small or
moderate-sized portfolios contribute to flexibility of portfolio adjustments in the light of changing
circumstances." Wharton Report, supra note 10, at 31 (footnote omitted).
152. Presumably, the shareholders expected at the time of ratification that the fee was to
serve as consideration for the investment advice to be rendered. "With respect to the performance
of mutual funds, it was found that on the average, it did not differ appreciably from what would
have been achieved by an unmanaged portfolio consisting of the same proportions of common
stocks, preferred stocks, corporate bonds, Government securities, and other assets as the
composite portfolios of the funds. About half of the funds performed better, and half worse, than
such [an] unmanaged portfolio. While it might be expected that investors would be willing to pay
higher prices in the form of management fees or sales charges for those funds with the better
performance records, no relationship was found between performance and the amount of the
management fee or the amount of the sales charge. It follows, on the basis of this evidence, that
investors cannot assume that the existence of a higher management fee or a higher sales charge
implies superior performance by the fund." Id. at x-xi.
153. Investment Company Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1976).
154. 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1975).
155. Id. at 745; see Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934
(1977); Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943
(1978); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
156. Imperial Financial Servs., Inc., SEC Release No. 7684, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) 77,287, at 82,455, 82,464 (1965).
ADVISORY FEES
adviser must disclose any matter "that could be thought to be of possible
significance. '" 1-7 Although disclosure might be considered the "keystone" of
federal securities laws,1 5 8 itshould not be overemphasized in relation to the other
factors that make up an evaluation of advisory fees. As Chief Judge Kaufman
stated for the Second Circuit in Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp. :159 "[Elven where a
fiduciary has made full disclosure, it is the duty of a federal court to subject the
transaction to rigorous scrutiny for fairness."'' 60
An extension of the disclosure requirements for information contained in
prospectuses and shareholder proxies also merits consideration. Specifically,
investment advisers should be required to disclose the dollar amounts of the
fund's advisory fees for at least three years prior to the date of the prospectus or
proxy in addition to the current rate of the advisory fee. Shareholders will then be
able to consider changes in the fee the fund pays from year to year and to assess
the returns on their investments in light of those changes. Such information is
especially valuable to investors when advisory fees increase progressively in
dollar value due to fund growth,16' even if the board lowers the percentage
rate to give the shareholders the impression that the fee is being decreased.
Under the suggested analysis, a court may also examine the fund directors'
diligence during deliberations over the advisory fee submitted by the adviser for
their approval. Judge Friendly stated the guideline with which to measure the
directors' deliberations in Fogel v. Chestnutt: 62
The minimum requirement to enable the [f ]und's independent directors to discharge [their
fiduciary] duties... [is] a careful investigation of the possibilities performed with an eye
eager to discern them rather than shut against them, and, if these possibilities were found
to be real, a weighing of their legal difficulties and their economic pros and cons.' 6
Assuming that the directors meet the Fogel test, they are further required to
arrive at a reasonable business judgment. 164
CONCLUSION
In advisory fee litigation, the court should reject any contention that the fee is
so excessive that it alone constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, it
should analyze the advisory contract in light of all the circumstances. Only in
this way can the court provide both the fund and its adviser with a fair test,
conducted in accordance with the Congressional intent behind the Investment
Company Act.
Angelo G. Savino
157. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 377 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). quoted
in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1975).
158. PPI, supra note 7, at 127.
159. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943
(1978).
160. Id. at 811-12.
161. The reason for the fund's growth must also be considered. See notes 140-42 supra and
accompanying text.
162. 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1975).
163. Id. at 749-50.
164. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
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